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ABSTRACT: Science appears, to the eyes of contemporary man, as the most reliable guide to the 
human enterprise. However, we possess little awareness as to what the proper meaning of 
scientific specialization is, and this knowledge is indispensable if we are not to proceed 
mindlessly in our relations to being. One of the most profound, coherent, and penetrating 
insights into this matter is constituted by the work of contemporary Italian philosopher 
Emanuele Severino, whose discourse demonstrates how scientific specialization is the most 
coherent consequence of humanity’s most ancestral relationship to being, how every human 
decision enacts the essence of scientific specialization, and thus why all past and present 
denunciations of scientific specialization (i.e., all denunciations inscribed within the framework 
of humanity’s most ancestral relationship to being) have fallen, and must continue to fall, 
unheeded, by necessity. Severino invites us to reframe the opposition between specialized and 
transdisciplinary work: we must comprehend the necessity of the dominance of scientific 
specialization on our time, and while this comprehension may prove scientific specialization to 
be just, it may also provide the requisite basis for the imperative re-structuring of arguments in 
favor of transdisciplinarity. By focusing on one of Severino’s major theoretical works (Oltre il 
linguaggio, 1992) – but also with an eye to several other key texts –, this essay aims to introduce 
international readers to a specific facet of Severino’s discourse, and in order to do so translates 
passages of his work that have never appeared in English.  
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1. SCIENTIFIC SPECIALIZATION AND THE DISTANT PAST 
Science appears, to the eyes of contemporary man, as the most reliable guide to 
the human enterprise. It is our most efficient tool, it enables our understanding 
and resolution of more and more adversities. It is formed by a multiplicity of 
scientific approaches to knowledge and action, each of which pursues (and 
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achieves) ever higher intensities of specialization. Specialization gives science its 
capacity to indefinitely extend its knowledge and control over the objects of its 
analysis. For this reason, indeed, science establishes itself as and through 
specialization, and thus partitions reality into a set of discrete parts and 
analyzes them in isolation from the totality of the context in which they are 
originally found. The spirit of our time follows the lead of scientific 
specialization, and so do our actions. In this sense, our relation to the world 
and to ourselves has changed, and our present conception of the humanities is 
no more than a consequence of this vast transformation. 
However, we possess little awareness as to what the proper meaning and 
implications of scientific specialization are, and this knowledge is indispensable 
if we are not to proceed mindlessly in our relations to being. One of the most 
profound, coherent, and penetrating studies to offer insight on these issues is 
Emanuele Severino’s Beyond Language (Oltre il linguaggio, 1992), and especially its 
third chapter, “Scientific Specialization and Nothingness” (“La specializzazione 
scientifica e il nulla”).1 Our entire intellectual community concurs that 
specialization belongs to the core of the scientific practice and that 
specialization is a fairly recent event, when considered as the mode of 
configuration of our civilization. Severino accepts both claims, but his study 
testifies what has hardly been testified before when it explains why scientific 
specialization is the necessary and most coherent concrete consequence of our 
most ancestral relations to the world and to our thought, and thus how 
specialization has been inscribed in our conception of knowledge since the 
 
1 Emanuele Severino (1929-) is a contemporary Italian philosopher whose discourse is of a rigorousness 
and power as have rarely been witnessed. He has written around eighty or more books but, as of today, 
only one has been translated in English: The Essence of Nihilism (Verso Books, 2016) (readers of English can 
also find a collection of essays entitled Nihilism and Destiny (2016), edited by Nicoletta Cusano). This essay 
presents an introduction to only one facet of Severino’s discourse. The hope is of doing service to the 
international community by providing a means of access to work that is, as of now, available only in 
Italian. I myself have translated all of the citations from Severino’s work, and I have also translated the 
titles of his essays and books in order to favor reader-friendliness. The original passages and titles are 
always reported in parenthesis after the translation. In the ‘works cited’ list, Severino’s works are listed in 
alphabetical order according to their original Italian title. Finally, the reader should know that an 
introduction is always an interpretation, and that an interpretation, in its essence, always does injustice to 
the original work. The entirety of human discourse is subject to the principle of indexicality, and thus 
nothing can truly speak of a work except for the work itself (these principles too belong to the core of the 
philosophy that appears in the writings of Emanuele Severino). 
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dawn of time. By attending to his study, then, one can begin to grasp the true 
constitutional meaning of scientific specialization, and thus why it dominates 
our relation to existence, and why the contemporary counter-cultural 
denunciations of its practice must, by necessity, fall unheeded: 
The specialized constitution of science belongs by now to the essence of 
scientific research and practice. There is no science where there is no 
specialization; that is, the application of the experimental method to a 
particular field of objects. This is a fairly recent circumstance in the history of 
our civilization, but the method by which scientific specialization contemplates 
the world is far more ancient. It dates back to when man began to perceive 
himself as an autonomous center of action; that is, capable of deciding. Deciding 
makes acting autonomous. To act without deciding is to depend on something 
other. The meaning of scientific specialization, we say, is, in its essence, tied to 
the meaning of deciding. But what does this mean, and what makes this claim 
possible? (Il carattere specialistico della scienza appartiene ormai all’essenza della ricerca e 
della prassi scientifica. Non c’è scienza dove non c’è specializzazione, ossia applicazione del 
metodo sperimentale a un campo particolare di oggetti. Si tratta di una circostanza piuttosto 
recente nella storia della nostra civiltà. Ma il modo di considerare il mondo, che viene messo in 
atto nella specializzazione scientifica, è molto più antico. Risale al tempo in cui l’uomo 
incomincia a sentirti un centro autonomo di azione, cioè capace di decidere. Il decidere rende 
autonomo l’agire; se si agisce senza decidere, si dipende da altro. Il senso della 
specializzazione scientifica, diciamo, è essenzialmente legato al senso del decidere. Ma che 
senso ha, e come è possibile questa affermazione?, 57). 
2. CONTEXT AND ISOLATION 
Specialization begins when man begins to perceive himself as an autonomous 
center of action, capable of deciding. But man has always perceived himself as 
an autonomous center of action, and thus, according to Severino’s discourse, 
specialization belongs to our contemplation of the world since the original 
appearance of human thought. Specialization means to look at the species. The 
original Latin meaning of species is “image,” “appearance,” “spectacle,’ “form.” 
The related verb specere means “to observe,” “to watch,” “to look at,” “in the 
strong sense of ‘looking toward an object, a destination, a goal’” (“nel senso forte 
di ‘guardare verso un oggetto, una meta, uno scopo,’” ibid.). The species, then, is that 
which lets itself be seen; it is that which is visible, and “it is by virtue of its 
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visibility that the species can be observed, analyzed, controlled, measured, 
desired, feared, refused, shunned” (“la visibilità della species è ciò per cui quest’ultima 
può essere osservata, analizzata, controllata, misurata, desiderata, temuta, rifiutata, fuggita,” 
ibid. 58). The visibility of the species is inversely proportional to its blending with 
its surroundings; the species is visible only if it is not confused with its context, 
and thus it must be separate from all other species and from the totality of all 
species in order to be visible, and thus to be itself. Specialization is the conduct 
toward things that results from the conceptualization of things as species, and 
thus scientific specialization is nothing but most coherent and powerful action 
that can result from such conceptualization. Scientific specialization is “the 
certainty of the difference between things” (“la convinzione della differenza tra le 
cose,” ibid.) put into practice; it “isolates a part (species) of reality; it separates it 
from the other parts in order to be able to observe […] its configuration and 
behavior” (“isola una parte (species) della realtà, la separa dalle altre per poterne 
osservare […] la configurazione e il comportamento,” ibid. 58-59). This isolation of the 
part is conducted in accordance with “the criterion of delimitation of the part” 
(“il criterio della limitazione della parte,” ibid., 59), which is constructed on the 
“principle that delimitation has scientific value only if the exclusion of the 
context does not alter the resulting knowledge of the part and does not impede 
its use toward the ends of the research” (“principio che la delimitazione ha valore 
scientifico solo se il prescindere dal contesto non altera la conoscenza della parte e non ne 
impedisce l’utilizzazione in vista dei fini che la ricerca si propone,” ibid.). Of course, 
scientific specialization does not exclude, in principle, that a determined area of 
the context that was previously considered inessential to the knowledge of the 
isolated part may thereafter reveal itself as essential and thus non-excludable, 
“but the fundamental orientation of scientific development is to move toward 
the progressive expansion of the contexts that specialized research can exclude” 
(“ma la direzione generale dello sviluppo della scienza è verso un progressivo allargamento dei 
contesti dai quali la ricerca specialistica può prescindere,” ibid.). 
Therefore—as Severino writes in the third volume of his history of 
philosophy, Philosophy from the Greeks to Our Time: Contemporary Philosophy (La 
filosofia dai greci al nostro tempo: la filosofia contemporanea, 1996)—, while the scientific 
stance intends to extend its domain to as many sectors of reality as possible and 
to connect its divergent analyses of the fragments of reality (every form of 
interdisciplinarity belongs to this intention), and while, for example, the 
publication of the International Encyclopedia of  Unified Science was organized, from 
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1938 onward, “within neopositivistic-pragmatist culture” (“all’interno della cultura 
di tipo neopositivistico-pragmatistico,” 482), nonetheless, the unification that scientific 
specialization seeks “unites dimensions that it conceives as originally separate, 
and thus destined to remain so and to render accidental, precarious, 
temporary, contingent their every unification” (“unisce dimensioni che essa concepisce 
come originariamente separate e quindi destinate a rimanere tali e a rendere dunque 
accidentale, precaria, provvisoria, contingente ogni loro unificazione,” ibid.). 
But if scientific specialization, observation, analysis, control, and 
measurement all depend on the original visibility of the species, which itself 
depends on the original discreteness of all species, also: all other forms of human 
action and feeling (desire, fear, refusal, shunning, etc.) depend on the original 
discreteness of all species; that is, on their separation and isolation from one 
another. Our belief in the existence of “man” and of “human life” is the belief 
in our power to transform things, to exert agency over them, and thus to relate 
to “things” as species. That things exist as “things” (i.e. as species: discrete, 
distinct, separate, and isolated from one another) is the original necessary 
precondition for the possibility of the existence of “man” and of “human life” 
as we know them. Otherwise, the transformation of being would be impossible. 
For a human being to transform something, for agency to be conceivable, for 
decisions to be real, the “world” must be constituted by a series of discrete, 
separate, isolated things. It is only because things are separate and isolated 
from one another that we can observe, analyze, measure, control, desire, 
despise, save, and kill them, and so it is only because of the prior ontological 
isolation of all things that “man” can exist as the being who can organize 
means, realize ends, transform things, exert agency, make decisions. The 
postulation of this fundamental belief in the original presence of “things” as 
species, then, constitutes the original prerequisite for our conceptions of “man” 
and “life” to become possible. 
This basic belief establishes the foundation for the conceptualization of 
“man” and “life” as we know them, and it entails specialization as the proper 
mode of being and relation to the world and hence scientific specialization as the 
most coherent and powerful actualization of the proper mode of being and 
relation to the world. Accordingly, scientific specialization belongs to the 
essence of man, and by virtue of this belonging, must be recognized as 
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righteous and just (and this must be said for every act that coheres with the 
essence of scientific specialization). By virtue of its consistency, scientific 
specialization must be recognized as the most powerful realization of man. 
When man feels, decides, and acts—i.e. when he lives—, he isolates, and thus 
controls the things that he conceives as originally isolated and hence as 
isolatable. When scientific specialization pursues its end through its means, it 
isolates, and thus develops man’s essence to its highest coherence, power, and 
justice. To reject scientific specialization is to reject man. But no one has ever 
rejected man, and in consequence, throughout history, every denunciation of 
specialization has been inherently, logically contradictory, and it is a 
consequence of logical necessity, then (not of contingency, history, or politics), 
that every denunciation of scientific specialization has fallen unheeded, and 
that the world moves toward the infinite increase of specialization and 
technology. 
Severino explains what “man” has always meant in his “Ideological Man 
and Technological Man: Their Replaceability” (“Uomo ideologico e uomo tecnico: la 
loro sostituibilità”), in Capitalism without Future (Capitalismo senza futuro, 2012): 
As to his fundamental meaning, the human being has always been understood, 
throughout his history, as a technological being; that is, as a force capable of 
organizing means toward the realization of goals; as to his fundamental meaning, we 
say, to indicate the common meaning that underlies all the different and 
contrasting meanings by which the human being has been interpreted 
throughout time (and which, at times, as in the case of the mystic man, seem 
irreducible to the technological man) (quanto al suo significato fondamentale 
l’esser uomo è sempre stato inteso, lungo la sua storia, come un essere tecnico, ossia come una 
forza capace di predisporre mezzi per realizzare scopi: quanto al suo significato 
fondamentale, si sta dicendo, ossia quanto al significato comune che è sotteso ai diversi e anche 
contrastanti significati secondo i quali l’esser uomo è stato via via interpretato (e che a volte, come 
ad esempio nel caso dell’uomo mistico, sembrano irriducibili all’uomo tecnico), 85). 
Since “man” is a force capable of organizing means toward the realization 
of goals, and since “things” are species: discrete, distinct, separate, and isolated 
from one another, then scientific specialization—which treats things as species in 
order to organize means toward the realization of the goals of man—is the 
practice that most coheres to our most basic beliefs about the nature of being. 
For human life to organize itself through scientific specialization, then, is only 
natural, righteous, and just. For this reason, if the present configuration of 
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scientific specialization is only a fairly recent circumstance in our history, we 
must recognize that the concepts of specialization and expertise have always 
laid the foundations of human civilizations (to give just one example, when 
Bertrand Russell writes about the Hellenistic age in his History of  Western 
Philosophy (1946), he writes that “specialization characterized the age in all 
departments, not only in the world of learning” (260); examples of the kind 
could be extended all the way to the archaic man). In this sense, the power of 
man has always depended on the extent of man’s possession of specialized 
expertise. 
As Severino writes in his Téchne: The Roots of  Violence (Téchne: Le radici della 
violenza, 2002), this “is, no more no less, the self-conception that Western culture 
has always retained, and which has attained singular emphasis in bourgeois 
culture” (“è, né più né meno, il concetto che la cultura occidentale ha sempre avuto di se 
stessa e che ha trovato una particolare accentuazione nella cultura borghese,” 122). In the 
17th century, science started to decisively separate itself from philosophy, and as 
a result modern science was born. For Severino, this process was inevitable, 
and so is the process whereby we today witness – as he writes in his Contemporary 
Philosophy – how “the methods of the natural and mathematical sciences come 
to be applied to the various aspects of human reality” (“i metodi delle scienze della 
natura e di quelle matematiche vengono applicati anche ai vari aspetti della realtà umana,” 
481). Scientific specialization has invaded the humanities, and while philosophy 
has become the servant of science, literary studies try to become as “scientific” 
as possible to justify their survival. The course of our civilization, in this sense, 
proceeds according to necessity (and it is thus ineluctable), because the rise and 
expansion of scientific specialization institutes the progressive fulfilment of what 
have been our most basic beliefs about the nature of reality, man, and things, 
since the dawn of time. In this sense, throughout history, every denunciation of 
scientific specialization has established misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations, and has been inherently, logically contradictory by virtue of 
its sharing the same fundamental beliefs about being by which the justice and 
power of scientific specialization must be recognized as axiomatic. For this 
reason, all of these denunciations have then fallen unheeded by necessity, and 
every contemporary decrier of scientific specialization has accomplished 
nothing but (1) the demonstration of the contradictoriness of his own discourse, 
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(2) the reinforcement of the hegemony of scientific specialization through the 
display of the contradictoriness of his denunciation, and (3) the enhancement of 
the hegemony of scientific specialization through the display of a discourse 
whose essence—unknowingly—exhibits the same fundamental beliefs about the 
nature of reality, man, and things that render the justice and power of scientific 
specialization unquestionable. These beliefs comprise the theory of being that 
interprets reality as the place where the co-existence of things as isolated species 
and of “man” as a center of action occurs, where man is capable of deciding 
and organizing means toward the realization of ends, where “things” exist as 
species discrete, distinct, separate, and isolated from one another (and thus as 
separable and isolatable, analyzable and controllable), and where “life” is the 
occurrence of endless transformation. 
3. SCIENCE AND MYTH 
Scientific specialization is the most coherent fulfilment of what have been our 
most basic beliefs about the nature of man, things, life, and reality since the 
original appearance of human thought. But so why is scientific specialization 
such a recent configuration in the history of human civilization, and why—by 
virtue of its being a configuration—must it fight all other configurations that 
claim the right to shape human civilization? One answer to these questions lies 
in the exploration of the relationship between science and myth and, most 
specifically, in the recognition of the ambivalence of this relationship: on the 
one hand, (a) science has constituted itself in opposition to myth, and as its 
eclipsing; on the other hand, (b) this opposition has occurred within the deeper 
ambient sameness that permeates the entire history of humanity and which, 
when understood, exhibits how the essence of scientific specialization was 
already contained within our traditions and thus how the opposition between 
tradition and specialization has always been both concrete (on the surface) and 
illusory (deep down). Through this understanding, then, and depending on the 
adopted perspective, (1) tradition can be seen to have always contained within 
itself the seeds of its self-destruction as it has occurred in the last two hundred 
years, through the death of all gods, the destruction of all unifying knowledges, 
and the advent of specialization and technology, (2) science can be understood 
as the necessary consequence of the original mythic attitude, and thus as 
enacting the preservation and perpetuation of myth. It is through this 
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perspective that one can apprehend why scientific specialization is the 
necessary and most coherent concrete consequence of our most ancestral 
relations to the world and thought, and why it has thus been inscribed in our 
conception of knowledge since the dawn of time. 
To make sense of these claims we must again refer to Severino’s “Scientific 
Specialization and Nothingness,” in Beyond Language; and we shall start by trying 
to understand how and why (a) science has constituted itself in opposition to 
myth, and as its eclipsing, and how and why this opposition is, in essence, 
related to the history of our conception of the nature of reality. For Severino, 
“man rejects the guidance of myth when he begins to perceive himself as a 
center of action, capable of deciding” (“l’uomo non si fa più guidare dal mito quando 
incomincia a sentirsi un centro di azione, capace di decidere,” 59). “When, in the 
existence guided by myth, man perceives, in his acting and will, the acting and 
will of the Whole, his acting does not relate to the world by separating and 
isolating its parts; that is, his acting does not separate from the Whole, because 
his acting is the acting of the Whole” (“quando nell’esistenza guidata dal mito l’uomo 
avverte, nel proprio agire e volere, l’azione e la volontà del Tutto, il suo agire non si rivolge al 
mondo separandone e isolandone le parti: il suo agire non separa dal Tutto, perché il suo agire 
è l’agire del Tutto,” ibid. 61). In other words, in myth, man, “in his acting and 
deciding, perceives the presence of the Divine Forces that bear the weight of 
the universe” (“nel proprio agire e decidere avverte la presenza delle Forze divine che reggono 
l’universo,” ibid. 59), and therefore, “he perceives his acting as not his, but as the 
acting of the Whole itself. And thus, when he acts and decides, he does not feel 
separate and isolated from the Whole, and in this sense, properly speaking, he does not 
‘decide’” (“egli avverte il suo agire non come suo, ma come l’agire stesso del Tutto. Proprio per 
questo, agendo e decidendo, non si sente separato e isolato dal Tutto; e in questo senso, 
propriamente, non ‘decide,’” ibid., my emphasis). 
In myth, “to act” and “to decide” cannot mean what we take them to mean, 
because in myth man cannot be an autonomous center of action and thus, 
properly speaking, he cannot decide. In myth, the meaning of actions and 
decisions is codified within the unifying structural meaningfulness of the Whole, 
and thus it is the Whole that acts, not any particular being. Within this unifying 
meaningfulness, no decision is available to particular beings and so, also, 
properly, no “action” is (if by “action” we intend an act pursued by a particular 
being and one which follows a particular decision and strives to achieve a 
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particular aim through even the lowest conceivable degree of autonomy). “To 
decide” means “to make a choice from a number of alternatives” (OED), and in 
myth there are no alternatives, and thus no decisions to be made. In myth, the 
Whole is the Meaning: unchanging, unalterable, inflexible. The Whole is the 
only force, man does not decide nor act (unless “to act” does not mean to 
exercise even the lowest conceivable degree of autonomy nor to transform the 
world), and therefore he is not “man.” 
The mutual exclusion between “man” and the Whole is resolved, in myth, 
by the victory of the Whole.2 But then man begins to become conscious of his 
being a center of action, and the history of humanity becomes the progressive 
enhancement of man’s conscious awareness of his ability to act and decide, 
followed by the progressive coherence between this conscious awareness and 
concrete action. Therefore, after myth “come the epochs when man no longer 
feels the Whole in his acting and begins to perceive himself as an autonomous 
center of action and will” (“vengono le epoche in cui l’uomo non sente più il Tutto nel 
proprio agire, ma incomincia a percepirsi come centro autonomo di azione e di volontà,” 
ibid.). In these epochs, man must come to see himself as separate and isolated 
from the things of the world, and things themselves must appear to him as 
species: discrete, distinct, separate, and isolated from one another. Man must 
come to this perception because such perception is necessary if man is to be 
“man,” and thus a force and a center of action capable of acting and deciding 
and of organizing means toward the pursuit of ends. This perception is the 
necessary precondition without which “man” and “human life” are impossible, 
and so for man to exist the Whole must become changeable, alterable, flexible. 
In short, for man to exist the Whole must fall. Only through the fall of myth 
can man’s power of initiative arise: “the more man feels autonomous, the more 
he perceives the Whole as separate from him; the more he feels author and 
master (and hence responsible) of his actions, the more his actions become 
decisions” (“più l’uomo si sente autonomo, più sente il Tutto al di fuori di lui; più si sente 
 
2 Human history has witnessed the perpetuity of giant myths—perhaps, Christianity and Islam above 
all—that claim to allow the coexistence of “man” as an autonomous center of action and of the Whole as 
the Principle of Meaning. The proper critique that these giant myths deserve cannot be attempted in this 
study, but the reader should know that the philosophy of Emanuele Severino establishes that the mutual 
exclusion (and thus the impossibility of coexistence) of “man” and the Meaning of the Whole constitutes 
one of the fundamental principles of being. 
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autore e padrone (e quindi responsabile) delle azioni che compie, più il suo agire diventa un 
decidere,” ibid., 62). When actions become decisions, man becomes an 
autonomous force, and when man becomes an autonomous force, the things of 
the world appear as species, and myth and the Meaning of the Whole fall. After 
this fall, man is born, and so the ontological isolation of all things is affirmed. 
From this original severance, the world of scientific specialization and 
technology follows by necessity, and thus must be appraised as natural, 
righteous, and just. 
So Severino answers the questions of how and why (a) science has 
constituted itself in opposition to myth, and as its eclipsing, and how and why 
this opposition is, in essence, related to the history of our conception of the 
nature of reality. His answer unearths the most essential, and so presents an 
understanding of the historical opposition between scientific specialization and 
myth that is far more insightful than the myopic interpretation whereby 
contemporary secularism supports its delusion of realizing truth and rationality 
(science) over falsehood and irrationality (myth). Severino’s answer retraces the 
advent of science to our original conception of reality, and thus can account for 
the logic of our entire history without issuing gratuitous value-judgments in 
favor or against any of the configurations by which humanity has organized 
itself in time. However, when we interpret our history as the history of the 
opposition between science and myth, we only see the first side of the 
ambivalent relationship between these two epochs of humanity. We only see, 
properly, the surface of this ambivalence, and it is only from this viewpoint that 
what has just been said may appear contradictory. We have said, namely, that 
scientific specialization is the ineluctable, most coherent, concrete fulfilment of 
what have always been our most basic beliefs about the nature of reality: our 
belief that man is a center of action, capable of deciding and transforming and 
thus of organizing means toward the realization of goals, and our belief that the 
things of the world exist as species, distinct, discrete, separate, and isolated, and 
thus as observable, analyzable, measurable, controllable, transformable. Then, 
we have said that these beliefs arose as man separated himself from myth, and 
thus only after, and as a result of, the fall of myth. This seems a contradiction, 
but the appearance of this contradiction is illusory, and it is due to our lingering 
over the surface side of the ambivalent relationship between scientific 
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specialization and myth. The contradiction is resolved by exploring how and 
why (b) the opposition between scientific specialization and myth has occurred 
within the deeper ambient sameness that permeates the entire history of 
humanity and which exhibits how the essence of scientific specialization was 
already contained within myth and thus how myth itself contained the seeds of 
its own self-destruction—and so how, properly speaking, the opposition 
between myth and scientific specialization is (deep down) illusory, and how 
scientific specialization is the necessary consequence of the original mythic 
attitude, thus enacting the preservation and perpetuation of myth. Through 
this deeper investigation one can see how scientific specialization is the 
ineluctable, most coherent, and concrete fulfilment of what have always been 
our most basic beliefs. 
For Severino, since the original appearance of human thought, myth has 
structured itself as a contradiction, and it is this contradiction within myth that 
contains the seeds of myth’s own self-destruction and of all the transformations 
that human thought has gone through in history, leading to scientific 
specialization. By means of this contradiction, the process whereby man begins 
to perceive himself as an autonomous center of action, and so begins to 
separate himself from myth, “is a process that begins precisely within the 
existence governed by myth itself” (“è un processo che incomincia all’interno stesso 
dell’esistenza regolata dal mito,” ibid., 61). It is within myth that man begins to doubt 
“that every action, even the most irrelevant and banal, is the acting of the 
Whole” (“che ogni agire, anche il più irrilevante e banale, sia l’agire del Tutto,” ibid.). 
Hence man begins to doubt myth from within myth, and since the very 
inception of myth. From the start, the mythic meaning of the world begins to 
seem impossible to man because it denies man as an autonomous center of 
action. It seems impossible to man that every action in the world is the acting of 
the Whole. Man doubts the Whole as soon as he conceives it, and he doubts it 
because he feels he must be a center of action. Thus, man begins to perceive 
himself as a center of action since the very inception of myth, and since the 
inception of myth equates the appearance of human thought, therefore, man 
begins to perceive himself as a center of action since the very appearance of 
human thought. 
In this sense, myth contains within itself, and since its very inception, the 
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seed of its own self-destruction. This seed is the idea that man is a center of 
action. This idea belongs to the very appearance of human thought; it is at the 
root of the set of most basic and fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality 
that leads, by necessity, to the dominance, righteousness, and justice of 
scientific specialization (it necessitates that the things of the world appear as 
species). Therefore, scientific specialization is the necessary and most coherent 
concrete consequence of the very first appearance of human thought. This 
idea—the idea that man is a center of action and that things are species—must 
appear with the inception of myth and configure the contradiction of myth 
because myth is, from the start, incapable of sustaining the Meaning of the 
Whole that it seeks to affirm. This becomes clear, by way of example, when 
man reflects on transgression. A transgression is an act that differs from the Act 
that coheres with the Meaning that a society has agreed is established by the 
Law of the Whole, and thus by the Divine Forces that govern existence. Since 
the inception of myth, man believes he witnesses transgression, and as soon as 
man believes in the reality of transgression, the Whole is broken, and man has 
flexed the inflexible, altered the unalterable. If man can transgress (if 
transgression is real; if only the worst possible act is to be deemed 
transgression), then man can act as an autonomous center of action: he can 
decide, in accordance with his own will. Thus, if man can transgress, the Law 
of the Whole is immediately shattered, and so reality must be constituted by a 
multitude of species, separate and isolated from one another, moving 
autonomously, in accordance with their own particular wills. If the Law of the 
Whole truly were the foundation of reality, and thus if all action were the Act of 
the Whole, then no act would institute transgression: transgression would be 
impossible. But since the dawn of time man believes he can transgress, and thus 
the Meaning of the Whole is flexed and shattered since its very inception. This 
is the contradiction of myth, which myth has always institutionalized in its 
postulation of the opposition between the “sacred” and the “profane.” The 
“sacred” acts in accordance with the Whole; the “profane” does not. Thus, the 
profane acts autonomously, and so it shatters the Law of the Whole. But it is 
not the profane alone that shatters the Law of the Whole. It is the entirety of 
myth that shatters itself because, through the institutionalization of the 
opposition between the sacred and the profane, myth postulates that existence 
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is not governed by the Law of the Whole, but by the expression of the acts of 
autonomous, separate, and isolated wills. From the postulation of 
“transgression” and “profanity,” man is only one short and necessary step away 
from becoming conscious of the fact that even the “sacred” is an act that, if it 
accords with the Law of the Whole, it does so only by virtue of the autonomous 
decision of the particular will of the individual who could have acted otherwise. 
Consequently, the profane act must be punished in accordance with its 
profanity, and the sacred act must be honored in accordance with its sanctity. 
This entails that, even within myth, the most fundamental belief that man 
considers as the original unquestionable evidence of reality that must be held as 
prior to all other considerations is the belief that man is a technological being, 
capable of decision (action, transformation, organization, etc.)—and so that the 
things of the world exist as species, separate and isolated from one another. 
Thus, if myth postulates that reality is the Meaning, Act, and Law of the 
Whole; it also postulates—and at the most fundamental level—that it is not. In 
other words, myth postulates, on the one hand, that all occurrences result from 
the single Act of the Law of the Whole and, on the other and more profound 
hand, that all occurrences result from the autonomous will of particular actors 
who can decide whether to act in accordance with the Law (and so perform 
“sacred” acts) or against it (and so perform “profane” acts). This inherent 
contradiction drives the erosion of myth throughout history until the advent of 
the non-mythic sense of the world and, after that, of scientific specialization 
(and still after, for Severino, of the age of technology). This process demands 
the recognition that, since the original appearance of human thought, man has 
always been conceived as a technological being, capable of organizing means 
toward the realization of ends, and hence of deciding, acting, transforming, 
analyzing, measuring, controlling, dominating etc. Man has thus always 
believed in the existence of things as species, separate and isolated from one 
another: these beliefs have always constituted what man has always regarded as 
the unquestionable evidence of reality. For this reason—and since scientific 
specialization is nothing but most coherent and powerful action that can result 
from the conceptualization of man as technological being and of things as 
species—we must recognize, with Severino, that scientific specialization is the 
necessary and most coherent concrete consequence of our most ancestral 
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relations to the world and to thought, and that it has thus been inscribed in our 
conception of knowledge and action since the dawn of time. 
Thus, since the appearance of thought, man’s most fundamental theory of 
being has conceived the nature of reality as comprised by the existence of man 
as a technological being (capable of deciding) and of things as species. This idea 
has resided in the foundations, first, of the mythic sense of the world (which 
contradicted itself by, on the one hand, affirming this belief as fundamental and 
unquestionable and, on the other hand, denying it by asserting the Meaning of 
the Whole), and then of the non-mythic sense of the world, which is the sense 
of our time, when humanity is starting to free itself from the contradiction of 
myth so that its most fundamental idea about the nature of reality—its belief in 
the unquestionable evidence of the technological nature of man and of the 
existence of things as species—can reign freely, and so that man’s action can 
truly begin to cohere with man’s most fundamental belief (the time of true 
coherence between this thought and action will be the age of technology). As a 
result, properly seen, scientific specialization has not established itself in 
opposition to myth but is the necessary consequence of the original mythic 
attitude, and thus enacts the preservation and perpetuation of myth by freeing 
myth of its own inherent contradiction. It is in this sense, then, scientific 
specialization is the ineluctable, most coherent, concrete fulfilment of what 
have always been man’s most fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality. 
These matters, and their analysis by Emanuele Severino, are far vaster and 
more complex than they appear here. This essay merely delineates the basic 
structure of the argument, and in so doing hopes to manage to suggest the 
answers to the questions it raises. On the one hand, the key to understanding 
why scientific specialization is such a recent configuration in the history of 
human civilization resides in the recognition of the historical dominance of 
myth and, specifically, of the contradictory side that negated man’s most 
fundamental belief in himself as a technological being and in things as species. 
Likewise, the key to understanding why scientific specialization must still fight 
all other configurations of human civilization that claim the right to shape 
human civilization resides in the recognition that myth is not quite dead yet, 
and inhabits the heart of all still-alive traditions (myth and tradition are one 
and the same in their essence, which is their belief in the Absolute) that, today, 
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keep fighting scientific specialization for the right to shape human civilization 
(Religions, of course, are a great form of tradition, but so are all the variations 
of the epistéme and, for example, Capitalism and Communism—besides all the 
undeniable infinite divergences between the different forms of tradition). On 
the other hand, the key to understanding why scientific specialization has 
gradually come to dominate our civilization (and the process is not over) resides 
in the recognition that the world of scientific specialization and technology 
follows by necessity from man’s most ancestral, basic, and unquestioned belief 
in man as a technological being and things as species. Scientific specialization is 
the most coherent and powerful action that can result from such 
conceptualization of reality, and thus it must be appraised as natural, righteous, 
and just. The philosophy of Emanuele Severino and its interpretation of human 
history can account for all the different nuances of this process while doing 
them full justice and explaining their driving force. In addition, his philosophy 
explains why all denunciations of scientific specialization throughout history 
have fallen unheeded by showing the inevitability of this fall. Finally, it explains 
why the questioning of scientific specialization may occur only as the result of 
the questioning of what has always been unquestionable. 
4. SCIENCE AND DECISION 
In “Scientific Specialization and Nothingness,” Severino also elaborates a less 
theoretical, more tangible exemplification of why man has always considered 
himself as a technological being and things as species, and of why this basic belief 
demands the advent of scientific specialization. This exemplification requires 
reflection on the act of decision. As Severino states: “who decides—be it the 
simplest or most complex thing—is convinced of being and having all that is 
needed for the realization of what he decides” (“chi decide la cosa più semplice o più 
complessa è convinto di essere e avere tutto ciò che è richiesto per la realizzazione di ciò che 
egli decide,” ibid., 62). Let us consider the simplest of decisions by way of 
example. When I take an object, I am not deciding the existence of the object 
nor of my hand, but I am deciding to change the location of the object from its 
original position onto my hand. Even this simplest of decisions is possible only 
because, on the one hand, I am convinced that I am a center of action who can 
autonomously decide how to transform the world (if I weren’t so convinced I 
would never even conceive of the possibility of changing the location of the 
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object; the idea of “decision” would never even come to my mind) and, on the 
other hand, I am convinced that the object exists as a “thing,” a species that is 
separate and isolated—and thus separable and isolatable—from all other 
things: that is, I am convinced that the object is not inextricably tied to where I 
find it (again, if I were convinced of the object’s inextricability, then I could 
never even conceive of deciding whether to leave it there or take it into my 
hand, and thus separate it, isolate it from there). 
Therefore: I decide to take an object in hand only if I am convinced that the 
status of the object (for example, its being placed on a table) is not tied to the 
rest of the world by an inextricable tie; and therefore only if I am convinced that 
said status is separate and isolated (or separable and isolatable) from the context 
in which it is situated. No matter how copious may be the bonds that tie the 
object on the table to the rest of the world, I decide to take the object only if  I 
am convinced that those bonds can all be broken by the motion of my hand that 
takes the object. I decide to take the object because I am convinced that, as to its 
being in my hand, the object is separate and isolated from the rest of the world 
and thus depends only on me (Dunque: decido di prendere in mano un oggetto solo se 
sono convinto che lo stato in cui esso si trova (ad esempio il suo essere deposto sul tavolo) non è 
unito al resto del mondo da un legame indissolubile, e dunque solo se sono convinto che tale 
stato è separato e isolato (o separabile e isolabile) dal contesto in cui si trova. Per quanto 
numerosi possano essere i legami che uniscono l’oggetto posto sul tavolo al resto del mondo, 
decido di afferrare l’oggetto soltanto se sono convinto che quei legami possono essere tutti 
sciolti dal gesto della mia mano che afferra l’oggetto. Decido di afferrare l’oggetto, perché sono 
convinto che, quanto al suo stare nella mia mano, esso è separato e isolato dal resto del 
mondo e dipende unicamente da me, ibid. 63). 
For exactly the same reasons, I do not ever conceive of deciding whether or 
not to take the sun, and therefore I never strive to stretch my arms as far out as 
I can in order to do so. The decision never presents itself to me, either because 
I do not think that I am an autonomous force powerful enough to do so, or 
because I do not think that the sun will let itself be taken, or both—and the 
“insane” person who strives mightily to stretch as far out as she can in order to 
take the sun does not strive so while believing that she’s not powerful enough to 
do so, or that the sun won’t let itself be taken; she strives so because she believes 
that she is powerful enough to take the sun and that the sun will let itself be 
taken, and this is the condition of her “insanity.” 
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But this counter-example is misleading, because man’s inability to take the sun 
may be contingent, and a future when we may have to “decide” whether or not 
to take the sun is not impossible. The point of the counter-example is: what 
does it mean to take an object? If the action of taking an object entails a decision, 
then this action entails—by necessity—the beliefs in man as a technological 
being and in things as species (while if the action of taking an object does not 
entail a decision, then the meaning of “action” must be truly re-thought for the 
first time in history), and action has meant decision all throughout human 
history. When I change the location of an object and assign to this action the 
meaning of decision—that is, when I believe that “I” have changed the location 
of the object through the exercise of “my” decision over the location of the 
object—, I am by necessity defining this action as “my” action and “my” 
decision, and therefore I am believing in myself as a technological being (an 
autonomous center of action, capable of decision), and in things as species 
(separate and isolated, and hence separable and isolatable, from one another). 
“To decide is to separate the part from the Whole” (“decidere è separare la parte dal 
Tutto,” ibid.), and thus, again, it is to believe in oneself as a technological being 
and in things as species (it is also to believe in oneself as species, because the 
precondition of autonomy, force, and action is one’s own separation and 
isolation from other things, otherwise decision, action, power, etc. would be 
impossible), and therefore in one’s ability to analyze, measure, control, 
transform, and dominate the things of the world. “To decide is to be convinced 
of embodying an autonomous center of action, on which both the decision and 
what is burdened by the decision entirely depend” (“decidere è essere convinti di 
costituire un centro autonomo di azione, unicamente dal quale dipendono ciò che viene deciso e 
la cosa che viene investita dalla decisione,” ibid., 63-64). To decide is, therefore, to 
enact the essence of scientific specialization, because to practice scientific 
specialization is to relate to things as species while believing in oneself as a center 
of action and so act accordingly. Even in our simplest and smallest decisions 
and actions, we enact the mode of being that ineluctably leads to scientific 
specialization as the most coherent, concrete, natural, powerful, and just 
human practice in relation to existence: when you take a glass of water you 
enact the essence of scientific specialization; when you take a glass of water and 
then decry scientific specialization you are in contradiction. 
In To Caesar and to God (A Cesare e a Dio, 1983), Severino writes: 
If one were convinced that things are tied to one another by an inseparable tie, so 
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as to form an unbreakable web, then one could never decide to take even the 
lightest and easiest-to-take object in hand: the attempt would involve the entire 
web to which the object is inseparably tied. Moving the smallest thing would 
equate moving the entire universe. One thinks he can modify reality – and 
technology establishes itself through its conviction of being the power that can 
transform reality most effectively – only if one thinks he is looking at a world 
where things are separate, not tied by a web” (“se si fosse persuasi che le cose sono legate 
tra di loro e legate con un legame inscindibile, in modo da formare una rete che non può essere 
spezzata, allora non ci si deciderebbe nemmeno a prendere in mano il più leggero e afferrabile 
degli oggetti: il tentativo coinvolgerebbe tutta la rete in cui l’oggetto sarebbe inserito. Smuovere la 
cosa più piccola equivarrebbe a smuovere l’intero universo. Si crede di poter modificare la realtà – 
e la tecnica si costituisce attraverso la convinzione di essere la potenza che trasforma la realtà nel 
modo più efficace – solo se ci si tiene dinanzi un mondo in cui le cose sono separate, non sono 
legate da una rete, 147). 
Thus, the original belief in human action as decision—the belief in man as 
technological being and things as species—separates the part from the Whole 
and so shatters the inextricable tie that constitutes the Meaning and the Law of 
the Whole that is affirmed by myth since its inception (if I were convinced that 
the Law of the Whole inextricably ties the universe into its Meaning, the 
possibility of decision would never present itself to me). Since the dawn of time, 
man acts and decides: he thus destroys myth and enacts the essence of scientific 
specialization. From the simplest action (taking a glass of water) to the most 
complex action (establishing the dominance of the scientific apparatus on earth 
and beyond), man enacts his belief in his power to transform the things of the 
world, and thus his belief in himself as a technological being and in things as 
species. The simplest of human actions (taking a glass of water) postulates that 
man is an autonomous center of action and that things are separate and 
isolated, and thus separable and isolatable from one another. These beliefs are 
the essence of decision and, likewise, of scientific specialization, as Severino 
explains, once again, in Beyond Language: “scientific specialization isolates the 
species from the context and establishes the knowledge of the species as 
independent from the knowledge of the context, […] it thus considers itself 
capable of untying all the bonds that factually unite the part to the context” (“la 
specializzazione scientifica isola la species dal contesto e pone la conoscenza della species 
come indipendente dalla conoscenza del contesto, […] cioè si considera capace di sciogliere 
tutti i legami che di fatto uniscono la parte al contesto,” 64). In this sense, scientific 
specialization is nothing but the most powerful actualization of human decision 
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and is fully coherent with the theory of being that decision presupposes, and 
Severino illustrates this through another concrete example: 
even before constructing a hydroelectric power plant that separates the water of a 
river or lake from its original status of unity with the rest of the world, the decision 
to construct a power plant assumes that water is something that is originally 
separate from its context; that is, something that can be known and used 
independently of all the infinite dimensions of the universe that do not belong to 
the finite set of factors that the available scientific knowledge considers to be 
relevant to the construction of a hydroelectric power plant (“prima ancora di 
costruire una centrale idroelettrica, che separa l’acqua di un fiume o di un lago dallo stato in cui 
essa si trova originariamente, unita al resto del mondo, la decisione stessa di costruire una 
centrale assume l’acqua come qualcosa di originariamente separato dal proprio contesto, cioè 
come qualcosa che può essere conosciuto e utilizzato indipendentemente da tutte le infinite 
dimensioni dell’universo che non rientrano nell’insieme finito di fattori che le conoscenze 
scientifiche a disposizione ritengono connessi alla costruzione di una centrale idroelettrica,” 
ibid., 63). 
Thus, scientific specialization does nothing more than make decisions. Its 
distinctive quality is its being the most coherent, radical, effective, powerful 
actualization of human decision and thus action. Therefore, scientific 
specialization is the concrete realization of  the essence of  man. If man is a technological 
being, then the infinite strengthening of scientific specialization and the advent 
of the age of technology represent the fullest realization of what it means to be 
human, and thus they also represent humanity’s utmost moral obligation. 
Everyone, today, agrees that the most unquestionable evidence of existence is 
that man is a center of action, capable of deciding, and that things exist as 
species, and are thus dominatable (even scientific determinism does). This 
agreement entails, despite the contradictory voices of those who claim 
otherwise, that scientific specialization is the most coherent, most powerful, 
righteous, and just configuration of human civilization on earth. The advent of 
the age of technology is the realization of true humanism, and scientific 
specialization is the engine of its coming. All these consequences are 
unavoidable, according to Severino, once one postulates that man is a 
technological being and that things exist as species. If this theory of reality is 
true, then scientific specialization (its most coherent consequence) is righteous 
and just, and as long as humanity regards this theory as true, scientific 
specialization will justly dominate the configuration of humanity, and it will do 
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so by necessity, toward the age of technology. 
The proper questioning of scientific specialization may come only as a 
result of the questioning of this theory of reality—the theory of reality that 
constitutes humanity’s most ancestral relationship to being. For Severino, this 
theory constitutes the greatest folly. It is the essence of nihilism and of all 
violence ever since the original appearance of man. 
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